[1]李强,罗也骁,倪志华.基于委托代理理论的工程变更监督机制模型[J].深圳大学学报理工版,2016,33(3):301-308.[doi:10.3724/SP.J.1249.2016.03301]
 Li Qiang,Luo Yexiao,and Ni Zhihua.Supervision model of engineering change based on principal-agent theory[J].Journal of Shenzhen University Science and Engineering,2016,33(3):301-308.[doi:10.3724/SP.J.1249.2016.03301]
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基于委托代理理论的工程变更监督机制模型()
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《深圳大学学报理工版》[ISSN:1000-2618/CN:44-1401/N]

卷:
第33卷
期数:
2016年第3期
页码:
301-308
栏目:
数学与应用数学
出版日期:
2016-05-20

文章信息/Info

Title:
Supervision model of engineering change based on principal-agent theory
文章编号:
201603012
作者:
李强罗也骁倪志华
西南交通大学经济管理学院,四川成都 610031
Author(s):
Li Qiang Luo Yexiao and Ni Zhihua
School of Economy and Management, Southwest Jiaotong University, Chengdu 610031, Sichuan Province, P.R.China
关键词:
管理工程委托代理工程变更监督努力程度风险分摊
Keywords:
management engineering principal-agent engineering changes supervision effort level risk-sharing
分类号:
F 284
DOI:
10.3724/SP.J.1249.2016.03301
文献标志码:
A
摘要:
以委托代理理论为基础,针对工程变更中业主与承包商的委托代理关系,建立工程变更的委托代理模型,考虑工程变更中业主的监督效果,构建业主对工程变更部分的监督模型,探讨工程变更中影响承包商努力程度的因素,明确了业主与承包商间的博弈关系.
Abstract:
On the basis of the principal-agent theory and in view of the actual situation of engineering changes, we develop a principal-agent model of engineering change and make some analyses about the model. Considering the effect of the supervision of the owners, we establish an owner’s supervision model to the parts of the engineering changes and discuss the factors which influence the contractors’ effort level. The game relation between the owners and the contractors is made more definite in the supervision model.

参考文献/References:

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备注/Memo

备注/Memo:
Received:2016-01-21;Accepted:2016-03-29
Foundation:National Natural Science Foundation of China (71571149)
Corresponding author:Associate professor Li Qiang. E-mail: 373120858@qq.com
Citation:Li Qiang,Luo Yexiao,Ni Zhihua. Supervision model of engineering change based on principal-agent theory[J]. Journal of Shenzhen University Science and Engineering, 2016, 33(3): 301-308.(in Chinese)
基金项目:国家自然科学基金资助项目(71571149)
作者简介:李强(1970—),男,西南交通大学副教授. 研究方向:项目管理. E-mail: 373120858@qq.com
引文:李强,罗也骁,倪志华. 基于委托代理理论的工程变更监督机制模型[J]. 深圳大学学报理工版,2016,33(3):301-308.
更新日期/Last Update: 2016-05-08