[1]李强,罗也骁,庞易明.基于前景理论的代建制寻租行为演化分析[J].深圳大学学报理工版,2016,33(2):173-179.[doi:10.3724/SP.J.1249.2016.02173]
 Li Qiang,Luo Yexiao,and Pang Yiming.Evolutionary analysis of rent-seeking behavior under agent construction system based on prospect theory[J].Journal of Shenzhen University Science and Engineering,2016,33(2):173-179.[doi:10.3724/SP.J.1249.2016.02173]
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基于前景理论的代建制寻租行为演化分析()
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《深圳大学学报理工版》[ISSN:1000-2618/CN:44-1401/N]

卷:
第33卷
期数:
2016年第2期
页码:
173-179
栏目:
数学与应用数学
出版日期:
2016-03-20

文章信息/Info

Title:
Evolutionary analysis of rent-seeking behavior under agent construction system based on prospect theory
文章编号:
201602010
作者:
李强罗也骁庞易明
西南交通大学经济管理学院,四川成都 610031
Author(s):
Li QiangLuo Yexiaoand Pang Yiming
School of Economics and Management, Southwest Jiaotong University, Chengdu 610031, Sichuan Province,P.R.China
关键词:
管理工程代建制寻租前景理论演化博弈
Keywords:
management engineering agent construction rent-seeking prospect theory evolution game theory
分类号:
F 284
DOI:
10.3724/SP.J.1249.2016.02173
文献标志码:
A
摘要:
近年来代建制寻租腐败事件屡禁不止,为有效抑制代建制寻租腐败行为,从有限理性的角度出发,使博弈方在收益感知和博弈决策的全过程中始终基于有限理性的假设,根据前景理论构建收益感知矩阵和代建制寻租行为演化博弈模型,合理解释了代建制模式下行为人的非理性行为,讨论了基于前景理论的代建制寻租监管策略,为完善代建制监管体系提供参考.
Abstract:
To control rent-seeking and corrupt behavior involved in under the agent construction system, we propose an income perception matrix based on the prospect theory and a rent-seeking behavior evolutionary game model under the agent construction system from the perspective of bounded rationality. In the proposed model, the overall process of perceiving income and decision making can always be based upon the hypothesis of bounded rationality, and the model reasonably explains irrational behavior under the agent construction system. Finally, we discuss the regulatory strategy of the rent-seeking under the agent construction system based on the prospect theory, which provides reference for the improvement of agent construction regulation system.

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备注/Memo

备注/Memo:
Received:2016-01-21;Accepted:2016-02-25
Foundation:National Natural Science Foundation of China (71571149)
Corresponding author:Associate professor Li Qiang. E-mail: 373120858@qq.com
Citation:Li Qiang, Luo Yexiao, Pang Yiming. Evolutionary analysis of rent-seeking behavior under agent construction system based on prospect theory[J]. Journal of Shenzhen University Science and Engineering, 2016, 33(2): 173-179.(in Chinese)
基金项目:国家自然科学基金资助项目(71571149)
作者简介:李强(1970—),男,重庆市人,西南交通大学经济管理学院副教授. 研究方向:项目管理. E-mail: 373120858@qq.com
引文:李强,罗也骁,庞易明. 基于前景理论的代建制寻租行为演化分析[J]. 深圳大学学报理工版,2016,33(2):173-179.
更新日期/Last Update: 2016-03-04