[1]易俊.逆向供应链群体演化的Stackelberg博弈分析[J].深圳大学学报理工版,2013,30(No.1(001-110)):103-108.[doi:10.3724/SP.J.1249.2013.01103]
　Yi Jun.Stakelberg game analysis of reverse supply chain with group evolutionary characteristic[J].Journal of Shenzhen University Science and Engineering,2013,30(No.1(001-110)):103-108.[doi:10.3724/SP.J.1249.2013.01103]
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逆向供应链群体演化的Stackelberg博弈分析()
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《深圳大学学报理工版》[ISSN:1000-2618/CN:44-1401/N]

卷:
第30卷
期数:
2013年No.1(001-110)
页码:
103-108
栏目:
交通物流
出版日期:
2013-01-31

文章信息/Info

Title:
Stakelberg game analysis of reverse supply chain with group evolutionary characteristic
作者:
易俊
暨南大学财务与国有资产管理处，广州 510632
Author(s):
Yi Jun
Department of Finance and State-owned Assets Management, Jinan University, Guangzhou 510632, P.R.China
关键词:
供应链;  博弈论;  逆向物流;  演化算法;  演化博弈;  斯塔克伯格博弈;  废品回收;  个体商贩群
Keywords:
supply chain;  game theory;  reverse logistics;  evolutionary computation;  evolutionary game;  Stackelberg game;  recycling waste;  itinerant traders group
分类号:
F 205
DOI:
10.3724/SP.J.1249.2013.01103
文献标志码:
A
摘要:
建立具有群体演化特征的逆向供应链斯塔克伯格（Stakelberg）博弈模型，分析逆向供应链上游制造商或回收厂的机会主义行为，指出“幼稚”的下游个体商贩群体面临分拣、未加处理和掺杂3种回收策略，并与“老练”的上游制造商进行价格竞争．仿真分析表明，若制造商或回收厂遵守按质论价的口头协议，则双方演化稳定均衡为帕累托最优；若制造商或回收厂为“机会主义”行为类型，则演化稳定均衡结果取决于个体商贩中采取分拣策略所占比例大小．
Abstract:
The itinerant traders and their family workshops become the mainly recycle models of Chinese reverse supply chain. The Stackelberg game model of reverse supply chain is built considering the group evolutionary characteristic. The itinerant traders are the puerile group facing three strategies, i.e., the sorting, the untreated and the adulteration, and the manufacture/recovery plant is the experienced individual player taken the second action. Both groups make the price competition. The results show that the evolutionary equilibrium result of reverse supply chain is the sorting and the higher recycling price, if the manufacture/recovery plant obeys the oral contract of pricing by quality. However, if the manufacture/recovery plant takes the opportunism behavior, the evolutionary equilibrium result depends on the itinerant traders sharing the proportion size of the sorting strategy.

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备注/Memo

备注/Memo:
Received：2012-06-09；Accepted：2012-12-05
Foundation：National Natural Science Foundation of China (70872039)
Corresponding author：Associate professor Yi Jun. E-mail: yijundoctor@126.com
Citation：Yi Jun. Stakelberg game analysis of reverse supply chain with group evolutionary characteristic［J］. Journal of Shenzhen University Science and Engineering, 2013, 30(1): 103-108.（in Chinese）
基金项目：国家自然科学基金资助项目（70872039）
作者简介：易俊（1965-），男（汉族），湖北省洪湖市人，暨南大学副研究员、博士．E-mail：yijundoctor@126.com
引文：易俊. 逆向供应链群体演化的Stackelberg博弈分析［J］. 深圳大学学报理工版，2013，30（1）：103-108.
更新日期/Last Update: 2013-01-20