[1]陆绍凯,何贤芬,姚雁飞.基于联合确定基数法的激励合同设计[J].深圳大学学报理工版,2008,25(1):55-60.
　LU Shao-kai,HE Xian-fen,and YAO Yan-fei.An incentive contract model based on combined defining base quota[J].Journal of Shenzhen University Science and Engineering,2008,25(1):55-60.
点击复制

基于联合确定基数法的激励合同设计()
分享到：

《深圳大学学报理工版》[ISSN:1000-2618/CN:44-1401/N]

卷:
第25卷
期数:
2008年1期
页码:
55-60
栏目:
土木建筑工程
出版日期:
2008-01-30

文章信息/Info

Title:
An incentive contract model based on combined defining base quota
文章编号:
1000-2618(2008)01-0055-06
作者:
陆绍凯1; 何贤芬2; 姚雁飞1
1)深圳大学土木工程学院，深圳 518060；
2)浙江万里学院设计艺术与建筑学院，宁波 315100
Author(s):
LU Shao-kai1;  HE Xian-fen2;  and YAO Yan-fei1
1)College of Civil Engineering,Shenzhen University,Shenzhen 518060,P. R. China
2)Faculty of Design and Architecture,Zhejiang Wanli University,Ningbo 315100,P. R. China
关键词:
合同管理; 不对称信息; 联合确定基数法; 目标成本; 风险管理; 报价行为
Keywords:
contract management;  asymmetric information;  combined defining base quota;  target budget;  risk management;  quoting behavior
分类号:
TP 712.4；F 294.1
文献标志码:
A
摘要:
提出一种基于联合确定基数法的激励合同模型，用以解决业主和承包商在合同谈判时的信息不对称问题．理论推导证明，在此合同框架下，承包商不仅会节约建造成本，且会在合同谈判中提出与实际成本相近的报价．通过实验探索承包商在风险环境下的报价行为，结果表明，在有较大期望获益且存在损失可能时，承包商的风险态度最易偏于冒险，而通过适当报价就能获得正向收益时，承包商的风险态度最为保守．讨论该结论在工程管理实践中的现实意义．
Abstract:
An incentive contract model based on combined defining base quota is proposed. This model is to deal with the unequal information availabilities between owner and contractor in determining the target cost. The theoretical derivation shows that the new contract model would promote the contractor to quote a price in line with the actual project cost during the negotiation phase, and to do his best in saving cost during the construction phase. An experiment was made to verify the new model and understand the quoting behavior of contractors in risky situations. The experimental results indicate that the contractors may quote relatively low cost when they face opportunities for gains but still with losing probabilities, and they would like to demand relatively high cost when the gains are assured. Some suggestions to use the new model are presented in the paper.

参考文献/References:

［1］Shr J F, Chen W T. 针对高速公路激励/惩罚合同中的最大激励设计［J］.建造工程和管理学报, 2004, 130(1)： 84-93(英文版).
［2］Bubshait A A. 激励/惩罚合同及其在工业项目中的影响［J］. 国际项目管理学报, 2003, 21(1)： 63-70 (英文版).
［3］王家远,申立银,郝晓冬. 公共建设项目工期延误风险研究［J］. 深圳大学学报理工版, 2006, 23(4)： 303-308.
［4］胡祖光.不对称信息条件下的委托一代理理论的研究与实践［J］.数量经济技术经济研究, 1998(5)：61-64.
［5］温波，金淑华.不确定性、风险偏好与利润基数［J］.税务与经济, 2006(4)： 69-72.
［6］Shafir E, Osherson D N, Smith E E. 优势模型：一种在风险中评估和选择的比较理论［J］. 组织行为和人类决策过程, 1993, 55：325-378 (英文版).
［7］Kahneman D, Tversky A. 展望理论：在风险下决策的分析［J］. 计量经济学, 1979, 47(2)： 263-291(英文版).

［1］Shr J F, Chen W T. Setting maximum incentive for incentive/ disincentive contracts for highway projects ［J］. Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 2004,130(1)： 84-93.
［2］Bubshait A A. Incentive/disincentive contracts and its effects on industrial projects ［J］. International Journal of Project Management, 2003(21)：63-70.
［3］WANG Jia-yuan, SHEN Li-yin, HAO Xiao-dong. Study on risks of time delay in the execution of public sector projects ［J］. Journal of Shenzhen University Science and Engineering, 2006, 23(4)： 303-308 (in Chinese).
［4］HU Zu-guang. The research and practice of principal-agent theory in asymmetric information situations ［J］. The Journal of Quantitative & Technical Economics, 1998(5)：61-64 (in Chinese).
［5］WEN Bo, JIN Shu-hua. Uncertainty, risk and profit base ［J］. Taxation and Economy, 2006(147)： 69-72 (in Chinese).
［6］Shafir E, Osherson D N, Smith E E. The advantage model： a comparative theory of evaluation and choice under risk［J］. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Process, 1993, 55：325-378.
［7］Kahneman D, Tversky A. Prospective theory： an analysis of decisions under risk［J］. Econometrica, 1979, 47, 263-291.

备注/Memo

备注/Memo:
收稿日期：2007-09-13；修回日期：2007-12-09
基金项目：建设部科技计划资助项目(04-1-001)
作者简介：陆绍凯(1979-)，男(汉族)，四川省成都市人，深圳大学讲师、博士．E-mail：shaokailu@163.com
更新日期/Last Update: 2008-02-17