[1]贾震,朱楚珠.审计合谋问题的分析模型[J].深圳大学学报理工版,2002,19(4):38-44.
 JIA Zhen,ZHU Chu-zhu.An Analysis Model of Conspiracy in Auditing[J].Journal of Shenzhen University Science and Engineering,2002,19(4):38-44.
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审计合谋问题的分析模型()
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《深圳大学学报理工版》[ISSN:1000-2618/CN:44-1401/N]

卷:
第19卷
期数:
2002年4期
页码:
38-44
栏目:
光电与信息工程
出版日期:
2002-11-30

文章信息/Info

Title:
An Analysis Model of Conspiracy in Auditing
文章编号:
1000-2618(2002)04- 0038- 07
作者:
贾震朱楚珠
西安交通大学管理学院,西安710049
Author(s):
JIA Zhen ZHU Chu-zhu
School of Management Xi’an Jiaotong University Xi’an 710049 P. R. China
关键词:
审计信息均衡博弈模型
Keywords:
audit information equilibrium game theory model
分类号:
TU 711
文献标志码:
A
摘要:
应用声誉博弈模型对审计中合谋问题进行数量经济分析,探讨和分析了审计人员与经营者对企业信息不完全披露的博弈关系.结果表明,在审计活动中代理人同审计人员存在策略性行为,代理人有贿赂审计人员使之产生合谋行为的可能,合谋行为将导致委托人利益损失及审计活动的无效,导致审计政策的随机性,严重影响审计结论的真实性.
Abstract:
In economic responsibility audit, there appears a problem that the information respectively held by the auditors and enterprise’s agents is asymmetrical. The article sets up the Report Game Model to qualificationally analyze the cahoots problem in audit. After analyzing the relationship of the games which the auditors do not completely disclose, we found that there may be strategical action between auditors and agents in audit practice, in other words, it is possible that the agents bribe the auditors for cahoots, which causes the benefit loss of consigner and the non-validity of audit, thus inducing the randomicity of audit policy and affecting the authenticity of audit conclusion.
更新日期/Last Update: 2015-12-11